Showing posts with label BP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BP. Show all posts

Monday, March 28, 2011

DNV Macondo BOP Final Report

DNV Macondo BOP report - Drill pipe at an awkward angle
DNV has released its final report into what went wrong with the Blow Out Preventer above the Macondo well - it was drill pipe not being cut properly, due to being at an awkward angle when the rams tried to cut it.


At the time of the accident, there was a drill pipe tool joint between the upper annular ram and the upper variable bore ram. When both of these rams were closed around the drill pipe, forces from the flow of fluids pushed the tool joint into the upper annular ram.

This meant that the when the blind shear ram was closed, it did not close the drillpipe smoothly, but pushed the pipe at an awkward angle, which meant it did not seal.

Note - it was not a problem of a tool joint being positioned between the blind shear rams at the time they were activated and the rams not being able to cut them (as many people thought it might be) - but the tool joint being in a position such that the rams could not cleanly cut the drill pipe.

An additional contributing factor was the fact that the upper annular ram, which closes around the drillpipe but does not squash the drillpipe, was closed at the time, because of the negative pressure tests which were carried out.

So the drillpipe did not have freedom to move - this also means that the rams were trying to close the drill pipe in a scenario which might have not been previously tested.

The liquids flowing through the well made it buckle between the upper annular and upper variable bore rams, which also led it to squash in an awkward way.

So as the blind shear rams closed, part of the drill pipe cross section ended up being trapped between the ram block faces, so the blocks did not fully close.

The evidence suggests that the blind shear rams were activated on the morning of April 22nd (the date the rig sank) - at this date the hydraulic plunger to the autoshear valve was cut, DNV says - although there is no way to be sure exactly when it closed, it could have been activated earlier by the deadman / automatic mode failure system.

When the drill pipe was sheared on April 29 with the casing shear rams, the flow just found a different route, going through open drill pipe at the casing shear rams, and up the wellbore to the blind shear rams.

DNV recommends that the industry makes further studies what effect flow through the drill pipe tubing and blow out preventer components can have on the ability for the BOP to close, with possible buckling of the drill pipe.

It also recommends that the industry should study the effects of tubulars being fixed or constrained in the blow out preventer as the rams close.

DNV recommends that the industry should also look at potential effects of certain activities (for example conducting negative pressure tests) can have on the ability for a BOP to operate in an emergency.

Saturday, January 8, 2011

Pump station leak shuts down TAPS

Pump station leak shuts down Trans Alaska Pipeline System

By CASEY GROVE

Published: January 8th, 2011 07:23 PM

The 800-mile trans-Alaska oil pipeline is shut down due to a leak at Pump Station 1 on the North Slope.

tool nameclose tool goes here North Slope oil producers have been asked to cut their production to 5 percent of normal.

An oil line encased in concrete leaked an unknown quantity of crude oil just outside a booster pump building, according to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. spokeswoman Michelle Egan. Alyeska operates the line and its pump stations.

A crew doing a routine inspection noticed the leak this morning and Alyeska shut down the pipeline at about 9 a.m., Egan said.

"There's no visible oil on the tundra," Egan said. "We believe it's all inside that casing."

While Alyeska staff believe the leak is contained, Egan said, they wouldn't know for sure if it had escaped that concrete structure until crews had a chance to excavate around the pipe. Crews are working to determine how to fix the line and get the pipeline running, Egan said.

Alyeska is unsure when oil might start flowing, she said.

"We want to make sure that we aren't going to make the situation worse by restarting, so we're being very careful and methodical about that," Egan said.

BP is in the process of cutting off production at the fields it operates, said Steve Rinehart, Alaska spokesman for the oil company. It will take time for wells to be shut in and pipelines and other facilities to be freeze protected.

Normal production from the North Slope fields averages around 630,000 barrels a day of oil. A 5 percent production level would be about 31,500 barrels a day. The oil fields have limited storage capacity, and the production that occurs will go into storage while the trans-Alaska pipeline is shut off.

BP runs most of the oil fields on behalf of itself and the other leaseholders. Conoco Phillips and Pioneer Natural Resources also run fields. BP, Conoco and Exxon Mobil are the major producers on the North Slope.

Rinehart said it was unclear how long the pipeline shutdown would last.

The pipeline runs from the North Slope to a tanker port in Valdez. Pump Station 1 is at the beginning of the pipeline. Alyeska runs the pipeline for the five oil companies that own it: BP, Conoco, Exxon, Koch Industries and Chevron.

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Still hope for gas pipeline

Study for DNR suggests future L48 gas prices will support gas from North Slope

Alan Bailey

Petroleum News


Amid current speculation about the future of the Alaska oil and gas industry, as oil production from the North Slope slows down and exploration drilling comes to a near standstill, it has become popular to add what some view as fading hopes for a future North Slope gas line to a general list of woes.

For, as the burgeoning development of plentiful supplies of so-called shale gas in the Lower 48 has caused a paradigm shift in the North American gas market, the price of Lower 48 gas has plummeted to levels below the projected transportation rates on a gas line from the Arctic, perhaps rendering the gas line uneconomic.



Objective analysis

In the interests of taking a rational look at the prospects for future Lower 48 gas prices, to replace worry-driven conjecture by objective analysis, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources commissioned consulting firm Black & Veatch to prepare a report on the future of North American gas prices in the context of the new shale gas revolution.
And the Black & Veatch analysts have found that, although there are major uncertainties around future North American gas markets, it is likely that gas prices in Alberta, Canada, will climb to somewhere between $5 and $7 per thousand cubic feet by 2020, with prices continuing to climb thereafter. And with a possible fee of $3.50 per thousand cubic feet for treating North Slope gas and carrying it by pipeline to Alberta, those gas prices could make a North Slope gas line viable, Antony Scott, a commercial analyst with Alaska’s Division of Oil and Gas, told Petroleum News Nov. 22.

DNR wanted an authoritative set of data, against which to benchmark the gas line project and had obtained funding from the Alaska Legislature for the Black & Veatch study, said Mark Myers, Alaska Gasline Inducement Act coordinator.

“This is a very robust study,” Myers said. “It’s like no other study we’ve seen out there in the literature.”

And Scott emphasized that the study tried to be unbiased in its views of future gas markets and, if anything, had underestimated the future cost and pricing of shale gas.



Technical breakthrough

Shale gas technology involves the extraction of natural gas from the impervious rocks where gas forms, rather than using the conventional approach of drilling into porous and permeable reservoir rocks that have trapped gas as it bubbles through subsurface rock strata. The use of high-tech horizontal drilling techniques that allow a well bore to pass for long distances through a shale gas horizon, coupled with the use of water and chemicals to fracture the rock, thus releasing the gas from the rock lattice, have been key enabling technologies in shale gas development.
The coupling of technical breakthroughs in shale gas production with the realization that vast areas of gas shale underlie various regions of the United States and Canada has triggered the shale gas revolution and caused a massive uptick in estimates of North American natural gas resources.

However, despite much hype about shale gas, with implications of vast gas supplies at rock-bottom prices, shale gas development still only has about a 10-year track record, with most of that record relating to one shale unit, the Barnett shale in Texas, Scott explained.

“It’s really important to recognize that outside of the Barnett we’re in extremely early days of the shale gas story,” Scott said.

But, after assessing various natural gas scenarios, the Black & Veatch analysts have concluded that shale gas production would figure large in any future North American natural gas supply situation.

“No matter what, there’s an awful lot of shale gas that is going to be relatively inexpensive to produce,” Scott said.



Price impact

The arrival of shale gas in the North American gas market, converting tightening production from conventional gas fields to a growing gas glut, caused gas prices that had climbed to levels approaching $8 per thousand cubic feet by 2008 to suddenly collapse, dropping to below $4 currently.
And the import of liquefied natural gas into the Lower 48, thought just a few years ago to be an inevitable growth industry as domestic supplies of natural gas decline, has now been pushed into the background.

“If you look at the price environment … it becomes hard to tell a story in which LNG finds an attractive home in North America,” Scott said.

Key drivers behind Black & Veatch’s view of future Lower 48 natural gas markets are the assumptions that the now-known abundant supplies of North American natural gas, coupled with an environmental preference for the use of gas rather than coal as a fuel, will push up the use of natural gas for electricity generation. On the other hand, while there are major uncertainties regarding future gas demand levels, there are also major uncertainties in estimates of the future costs of developing new shale gas resources.

For example, the supply of water for shale fracturing and the subsequent treatment and disposal of water produced from gas wells has represented a fairly modest cost element in the development of the Barnett shale, but will likely become a major cost factor in the development of shale gas in other basins.



Inconsistent data

But inconsistencies in the way in which finding and development costs for shale gas are reported make it difficult to assess whether those costs are compatible with current gas price levels, and Black & Veatch thinks that current prices may be artificially low.
“Current market prices for natural gas in North America may not provide adequate return for full development of shale resources in North America,” the Black & Veatch report says. “Significant levels of current shale production appear to be driven by requirements to drill to maintain acreage positions.”

Published shale gas finding and development costs in the Lower 48 range from $2.06 to $2.35 per thousand cubic feet, but these numbers do not appear to include factors such as land lease costs and water costs. Estimated costs of $3.25 to $4.25 per thousand cubic feet in western Canadian basins are likely nearer the full cost, although there are differences between cost reporting rules in Canada and the United States, Black & Veatch says.

And an examination of the production history of the Barnett shale provides some revealing insights into possible future shale-gas cost trends.

Essentially, Barnett shale production has seen a series of significant technical breakthroughs, each of which has caused a sudden jump in gas production. But the rate of increase in production has dropped back sharply after each technology-induced spike. And, contrary to popular belief, the cost of finding and developing additional volumes of Barnett shale gas appears to have increased rather than decreased over time.



Rising cost

The explanation for this conundrum seems to lie in the production characteristics of shale gas resources. In essence, a shale gas well achieves high initial production rates as the fractured shale rapidly releases its gas content. But, with the rock being relatively impermeable, that initial production rate drops off quite rapidly, requiring increasing effort to stimulate existing wells and the drilling of new well bores to sustain overall production levels.
The result is a production cost profile that curves upwards as more and more of the gas resource is accessed, until a law of diminishing returns places an upper cap on the total volume of gas that can be viably extracted from a particular shale gas resource, the Black & Veatch analysts concluded.

Recognizing the importance of individually considering the unique characteristics of each shale gas basin, the Black & Veatch analysts applied the upward curving cost model to each of the various U.S. and western Canada basins, to assess future gas production costs in different basin scenarios. Estimated water costs factored high in the distinctions between the scenarios — potential situations ranged from unlimited water access and the disposal of untreated water down wells, as for a Barnett shale development, to limits on water supplies and the need for the treatment of produced water, as would be required for developments in the Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania.

Additional costs, all subject to significant uncertainty and regional variation, include land access and government taxes.



Rising demand

But future demand for natural gas in North America should support the anticipated gradual rise in shale gas costs.
Black & Veatch has its own Lower 48 gas demand forecast that assumes gas demand for electricity generation will rise at an annual rate of 3.2 percent, with greenhouse gas regulation tending to drive the replacement of coal-fired generating capacity by gas-fired power plants. In 2010 the Energy Information Administration, apparently barred from considering potential changes in government energy policies, came up with a lower growth rate of 0.5 percent, on the assumption that there would be no future restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions.

And although the Black & Veatch projection of total demand from all uses of gas through to 2035 also exceeds the equivalent EIA projection, the Black & Veatch projection is “within the fairway” of several independent gas demand forecasts, Scott said.

“Power generation demand is going to be a really big story,” he said. “It’s going to matter a lot.”

Then, when it comes to the interplay between gas costs, gas demand and gas prices, the actual level of gas demand and the actual finding and development costs would appear to be the likely dominant future drivers of gas prices. And Black & Veatch assembled low, medium and high gas price scenarios, using a standard North American gas model to project, for each scenario, likely annual gas prices at different market hubs, together with likely annual production volumes from each shale gas basin, through to 2040.



Price scenarios

The low-price scenario assumes the relatively low EIA projection of future gas demand, together with low water costs; low finding and development cost escalation, along the lines of conventional gas fields; and modest tax rates. The medium-price scenario uses Black & Veatch’s shale-gas cost escalation model, together with Black & Veatch’s projection of future gas demand. The high-price scenario adds in increased environmental restrictions over access to shale gas resources, somewhat higher tax rates and relatively high water costs.
The low-price and high-price scenarios projected into 2020 result in the $5 to $7 per thousand cubic feet price range that may come into play in Canada at around the time when completion of a North Slope pipeline could be in the offing.

“Except in very extreme events we believe the Alaska (gas line) project — given what we know about the tariff structure today, the cost of producing gas at Prudhoe and Point Thomson — it looks like it should work,” Myers said.

http://www.petroleumnews.com

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Conoco to reassess Alaska gas pipeline

According to London's Financial Times, ConocoPhillips' chief executive Jim Mulva said recently that the company would reassess the economics of the Denali project, a $30 billion gas pipeline from Alaska to Alberta it is considering building along with partner BP. The reconsideration is coming because a glut of natural gas in North America, being driven by unconventional shale gas plays, is keeping forecast commodity prices low. The current price is so low that Conoco has even shut in some of its North American gas wells (as have other companies). Mulva candidly explained the decision: "We’d rather keep it in the ground for when it will have a greater financial impact.” The report doesn't mention whether or not that statement applies to Alaska's natural gas as well as the shut-in wells, but read much more, here. Alaska Beat thinks it's worth noting that the industry pretty much agrees that gas prices will likely stay low in the short term, but there has been quite a bit of uncertainty over what they would do in the long term. At the very least, Mulva's comments and Conoco's plans to reevaluate Denali's particulars indicate that doubts over the long-term price of gas are coming into greater focus and are significant enough to attend to.

Read More

Sunday, August 8, 2010

BP Doug Suttles Tours the Oil Spill Site




Doug Suttles, Chief Operating Officer, BP Exploration and Production, returns to the site of the oil spill to see the progress that has been made in the fight against the oil spill. "The things people have done here are mind-boggling." To learn more about BP's response in the Gulf of Mexico, visit http://bp.com/gulfofmexico

Static Kill Overview




In this video, BP Sr VP Kent Wells explains key differences between the Top Kill, which was unsuccessful, and the Static Kill procedure proposed to kill the MC252. Wells covers both the Static Kill and Bottom Kill procedures being planned for killing and cementing the MC252.

Tuesday, August 3, 2010

Static Kill Injectivity Testing Commences on MC252 Well

Release date: 03 August 2010
HOUSTON - BP started injectivity testing today at 19:05 (UK) and 13:05 (CDT) in advance of static kill operations. Based on the results of the injectivity test, pumping of drilling mud for the static kill could commence later today, following which a decision on the best way to cement the well will be determined. All operations are being carried out with the guidance and approval of the National Incident Commander. The aim of these procedures is to assist with the strategy to kill and isolate the well, and will complement the upcoming relief well operation.
The relief well remains the ultimate solution to kill and permanently cement the well. The first relief well, which started May 2, has set its final 9 7/8-inch casing. Operations on the relief wells are suspended during static kill operations. Depending upon weather conditions, mid-August is the current estimate of the most likely date by which the first relief well will intercept the Macondo well annulus, and kill and cement operations commenced.

Read More

Thursday, July 15, 2010

BP announces oil leak has stopped

BP announces oil leak has stopped in Gulf of Mexico for first time in 3 months (see live video)
Cindy Adams - US Headlines Examiner


BP oil spill update: Testing on new cap begins, spill should be contained by July 19

BP announced Thursday that oil has stopped leaking into the Gulf of Mexico for the first time since its rig exploded on April 20.

Undersea robots worked through the night on a leak that was found after BP began testing its new well cap Wednesday afternoon. The test was conducted by turning off pipes that send some of the oil to surface vessels so the full force of the oil was centered on the cap. After two of the three valves on the cap had been closed, it was determined that one was still leaking.

BP PLC Vice President, Kent Wells, said the new leak was repaired by replacing the assembly, or choke line, on the suspect pipe.

ABC News reports that the cap remains a temporary fix and the leak will only be permanently quelled after two relief wells that are currently being drilled can reach the leak and permanently plug it with cement and heavy drilling mud. BP has stated this will likely occur mid-August.

To see live video of the well and the repairs being done, click here.

Now that the leaky pipe has been replaced, BP will have to begin retesting by letting additional oil leak out of the cap temporarily and once again turning off a pipe that is sending oil to a surface ship, in order to determine whether the new cap can withstand the full force of the erupting oil.
Read More

Friday, July 9, 2010

New cap, ships could contain Gulf leak by Monday


By TOM BREEN
Associated Press Writer


NEW ORLEANS (AP) -- The federal official leading the Gulf oil spill cleanup said Friday a new containment cap and an additional ship collecting oil could effectively contain the spill in the next three days.

The work to replace a leaky containment cap on the well head with a tighter one will begin Saturday, National Incident Commander Thad Allen said. At the same time, a ship connecting to a different part of the leak is expected to come online Sunday.

Oil will flow unimpeded into the Gulf during the cap switch for at least part of the weekend.

If all goes according to plan, the combination of the cap and the new vessel could collect all the leaking oil by Monday, stopping it from escaping into the Gulf of Mexico for the first time since April 20.

"I use the word 'contained,'" Allen said. "'Stop' is when we put the plug in down below."

Work continues on what officials hope will be the final plugging of the well - drilling on two relief wells through which mud and cement will be pumped to stop the leak once and for all. That's expected to happen sometime in mid-August.

The new containment cap is expected to form a better seal over the well head, to allow more of the oil to be collected and sent up to ships on the surface for collection or burning.

"Technically it's pretty achievable," Allen said. He said if the new cap can't be placed on the well, the old cap will be put back and there are multiple backup caps available in case any one cap fails.

The new, tighter cap should be in place early Monday. Allen said the ship Helix Producer, which is to be hooked to a different part of the leaking well - lower than the new cap - will start collecting oil Sunday and be fully operational Tuesday. He has previously said that the full system should be able to collect 60,000 to 80,000 barrels a day.

The schedule for both efforts has been accelerated to take advantage of what could be a rare window of good weather. The hookup of the Helix Producer was delayed this week by poor weather. But an unexpected break in weather patterns creating choppy seas provides a window of a week or so with waves of only 1 or 2 feet.

"Everybody agrees we got the weather to do what we need," he said.

Containing the leak is not the same as stopping the environmental catastrophe that began April 20 when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, killing 11 workers.

The relief wells remain the best option for a final plug to the leak, at which point cleanup and restoration become the main focus.

Though officials said the first relief well could be finished by the end of July, weeks ahead of schedule, they are quick to point out that such an optimistic timetable would require ideal conditions every step of the way.

That is something that has rarely happened since the leak began.

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Costner's Centrifuge

Kevin Costner Ocean Therapy Press Conference

Ocean Therapy Solutions and BP news conference and update on the ongoing efforts to deploy Ocean Therapy's oil separating centrifuge devices in the Gulf of Mexico to clean up the Horizon oil spill.

BP has created this YouTube channel to engage the public in an informative conversation and dialogue about our efforts associated with the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. We want our page to be an appropriate forum for everyone. For more information on our Commenting Policy, please see the Latest News section on our main page: http://youtube.com/bp.


http://www.youtube.com/user/BPplc#p/u/8/tlse59oyY3A

For the latest updates and to join the conversation on the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, please visit our Facebook Page: www.facebook.com/BPAmerica.

For more information, please visit: www.bp.com.

Thursday, May 27, 2010

'Top kill' method 'slows BP oil leak' in Gulf of Mexico

Oil has been gushing from the well for the past five weeks BP has slowed the flow of oil and gas from a ruptured well into the Gulf of Mexico, a US official told local media.

The company's "top kill" effort has "stabilised the wellhead", Coast Guard commander Admiral Thad Allen said.

But he cautioned it was too early to declare success. This is the first step in BP's plan to seal the well for good.

'Low pressure'
Footage from BP's underwater camera
Adm Allen told US media the "top kill" procedure, which began on Wednesday, has pumped enough drilling fluid to block some of the oil and gas escaping from the well.

Adm Allen told National Public Radio that BP engineers had "been able to force mud down and not allow any hydrocarbons to come up."

It was the first positive official assessment of BP's latest attempt to plug the well, after previous efforts failed.

BP shares were up more than 5% in London trading following the announcement.

BP has not yet commented in detail on the situation, saying merely that its "subsea efforts [were] advancing on several fronts".

Live Feed Ocean Floor from BP

BP: Top Kill Operation - Animated - May 26, 2010

Animation showing the Top Kill process designed to stop the flow of oil from the well. Heavy "kill mud" is pumped down a drill pipe, then through hoses that go through the manifold on the seafloor. The mud then moves through another set of hoses attached to the Deepwater Horizon blow-out preventer's choke and kill lines, then into the well.
Animation showing the Top Kill process designed to stop the flow of oil from the well. Heavy "kill mud" is pumped down a drill pipe, then through hoses that go through the manifold on the seafloor. The mud then moves through another set of hoses attached to the Deepwater Horizon blow-out preventer's choke and kill lines, then into the well.
Click here to see animation on YouTube.


Deepwater Horizon Response

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Kevin Costner oil spill cleanup idea interests BP

By Mark Guarino

Film star Kevin Costner is joining the ranks of scientists, engineers, and lawmakers in an international effort to figure out how to contain and clean up oil streaming into the Gulf of Mexico at the rate of 210,000 gallons a day.
Mr. Costner appeared in New Orleans last week to demonstrate a $24 million oil extraction device he is pitching to BP and Coast Guard officials. Costner says the device will clean oil from the water at a rate of 97 percent. BP Chief Operating Officer Doug Suttles said Wednesday that his team will test the device next week.
Costner's involvement in helping solve oil spill crises is not new. The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster in Alaska motivated the actor to help fund a consortium of scientists to develop technology that mitigates oil-infected water before it hits the coast. The technology is ready to combat the BP spill, he told reporters last week.
"It's not anymore about talk," Costner told WWL-TV in New Orleans. "It's about doing the walk, and that phrase was probably invented down here."
Costner's company, Ocean Therapy Solutions, provides multiple machines designed to address spills of different sizes. The largest can clean as many as 200 gallons per minute, Costner said. The company reports it has 20 such machines ready to be employed.
"The machines are basically sophisticated centrifuge devices that can handle a huge volume of water and separate [the oil] at unprecedented rates," Ocean Therapy Solutions CEO John Houghtaling said last week.


Costner said the machines work by drawing in the infested water where it then breaks it down, allowing the oil to discharge through a separate pipe. His audience, a gathering of local parish presidents, appeared eager to get the device to the Gulf.
"To me, this is a major tool for a tool box that should be tested," said Craig Taffaro, St. Bernard Parish president.
Besides saying that Costner's device will be tested next week, BP's Suttles said his company and the Coast Guard have been collecting ideas from the public since Day One of the crisis. The command center receives 100 ideas a day, Suttles said.
Costner said his decision to fund the technology was a result of needing to use the wealth he was "lucky" to accumulate instead of "piling it" for no real purpose.
"We all make decisions about what we want to be a part of. I'm just one person focusing on a specific problem and throwing a little resources to a lot of talent and manpower ... to come up with what is a [solution]," he said.

Read More

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Gulf Spill: The Blame

May 19, 2010: While politicians and environmental groups step up to posture in the face of the Deep Water Horizon disaster, the company who is taking the brunt of the criticism has not been afforded the right to a fair hearing of facts in the press.

Since the well blew in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20th, several things have happened that warrant a clear and concise explanation.

In what stands to be one of the biggest oil spills in the history of the United States, the cause of the spill now appears to be an unauthorized modification of the blow out prevention (BOP) valve.


The Blame

BP's Deep Water Horizon oil rig exploded and sank off the cost of Louisiana last month. Eleven rig workers are missing, which was operated by Swiss-based Transocean Ltd, the largest independent driller in the world.

Meanwhile, the BOP failed to stop the flow of oil as it should have after the explosion and allowed oil to pour into the Gulf of Mexico. Fingers are being pointed at BP, even though Transocean was the sub-contractor.

Eventually, BP will be exonerated. But first we will all have to play a game of cover our asses.

From the subcontractor who reportedly modified the BOP without the knowledge or permission of BP, to the government regulators who okayed the modified BOP, to the Obama administration who wants to look tough on BP even thought they had no culpability, everyone is running for cover.

After the BOP was installed, the modifications made after the fact are assumed to have prevented the part from operating properly.

These modifications were discovered by remote operated vehicles whose pictures transmitted to engineers trying to find out why the BOP didn't activate, showed the part had been altered.

Government Response

Meanwhile, the Federal Government responded by splitting up the regulating and revenue collecting functions of the Minerals Management Agency, to as President Obama described, break up the cozy relationship between regulators and the oil industry.

However, the action to split up the functions draws attention to just who was responsible for permitting the BOP that failed to work. Could it have been that an MMS inspector didn't properly follow through with the BOP test monitoring?



BP's Safety Record

Much has been written since the well blew four weeks ago about BP's safety record. But that says nothing about the company today and the focus on safety they have made the last two years.

While many press accounts recall the explosion at BP's Texas City refinery in 2005, and the spill at Prudhoe Bay a year later, those incidents occurred before BP's current CEO Tony Hayward assumed control.

Since the spill, Hayward has been a visible point man for BP. He wasted no time in appearing on major network news shows to describe the situation on the ground. He has mobilized 2,500 workers to the site, including several from Anchorage, and he has accepted full responsibility for the disaster.

This shouldn't be surprising. After all it was Hayward, who in 2005 won accolades from BP employees for speaking out against the way the company was handling the Texas City disaster, criticizing his bosses for "a leadership style that is too directive and doesn't listen sufficiently well."

The Politics

The politics are bare knuckle.

The spill has given fodder to environmentalist to once again raise a ruckus about offshore oil & gas drilling. Congressmen, one right after another, attempting to look tough, are demanding answers from BP they already have received. And the White House continues to posture on the real issue which is; energy supplies come at a risk.

But the fact is the Gulf of Mexico accounts for almost a third of America's oil production and has been where most of the new finds have been for oil companies.

Furthermore, before the April 20th disaster, there hadn't been a leak from an offshore well in 40 years.

As the Economist recently opined, "If Americans do not want to hand more money and clout to the likes of Iran, Russia and Venezuela, the argument runs, they should not curb offshore drilling."

The impacts have reached Alaska. The spill has set off another round of opposition to offshore drilling in Alaska and age old worries about a spill in the Arctic conditions. But these concerns are unfounded.

Currently, as a result of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, Alaska has the toughest regulations in the world. Companies like Shell Oil who are exploring off Alaska's shores are required to abide by and held to a much higher standard of prevention and response then anywhere on the globe.

The more and more you hear of the Deep Water Horizon tragedy the more you'll learn that it was a careless contractor who set the stage for the disaster. And as I said, at the end of the day BP will be exonerated in my opinion.

Let's hope for the future of our nation's energy security we don't use one bad incident in 40 years as an excuse to stop offshore drilling.

And let's hope we get bp: beyond posturing.

Andrew Halcro's blog

Friday, May 14, 2010

Obama scolds BP

President Obama vented his frustration Friday during a statement to the press he issued from the White House Rose Garden.

Flanked by cabinet members and other administration officials overseeing the federal response to the blow-out, he lit into industry representatives who appeared at congressional hearings on the spill earlier this week.

"I did not appreciate what I consider to be a ridiculous spectacle during congressional hearings into this matter," he said. "You had executives of BP and Transocean and Halliburton falling over each other to point the finger of blame at somebody else."

Nor did federal regulators escape the tongue-lashing. The president criticized what he termed "a cozy relationship" between oil companies and federal regulators in which "permits were too often issued based on little more than assurances of safety from oil companies" and oil companies exploited loopholes that "allowed some oil companies to bypass some critical environmental reviews," Obama said.

Part of the challenge – and the frustration – in coping with the blow-out lies in determining just how much oil the submarine gusher is releasing.

Official estimates from the federal government and BP, which owns the oil lease the Deepwater Horizon was working, place the leak rate at some 5,000 barrels (210,000 gallons) of oil a day. That alone is has been enough to trigger a regional emergency response.

But independent experts say the leak rate is likely to be much larger.

A week ago, Florida State University marine scientist Ian McDonald put the leak rate at around 25,000 barrels a day.

And in a report Friday morning, National Public Radio cited estimates from three independent scientists who say at least 50,000 barrels of oil a day are flowing into the Gulf waters. That would imply that the Deepwater Horizon disaster could be releasing at least the equivalent of one Exxon Valdez spill every five days.

These estimates have wide margins of error, cautions Timothy Crone, a scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, N.Y.

In an email exchange, Dr. Crone, one of the three scientists NPR contacted, noted that his approach honed on estimating the material spewing from deep-sea hydrothermal vents.

He says that videos of the blow-out taken by robotic cameras at the well head lack the detail needed for more precise estimates of the flow. Moreover, the material emerging from the well head is a mix of methane, mud, and oil.

Taking all that into account, he puts the flow rate at roughly 50,000 barrels of oil a day.

"My numbers should be viewed with caution," he warns, but adds, "the flows are almost certainly higher than 5,000 barrels a day."

Read More

Hayward applauds President's statement on oil spill
Release Date: 02 May 2010
“The US government leadership here has been excellent since day one. I agree with the President that the top priority right now is to stop the leak and mitigate the damage. I reiterated my commitment to the White House today that BP will do anything and everything we can to stop the leak, attack the spill off shore, and protect the shorelines of the Gulf Coast. We appreciate the tireless efforts of the many federal, state and local responders and the volunteers, men and women who have worked tirelessly since the date of the accident to mitigate the damage. Our teams are working hand in hand and we look forward to hearing more recommendations for action from the President’s visit today.”



-Tony Hayward, from Houma, Louisiana






Hayward Comments on President Obama's Statement
Release Date: 14 May 2010
Tony Hayward, BP Group Chief Executive, today said:

“We absolutely understand and share President Obama’s sense of urgency over the length of time this complex task is taking. We want to thank the President and his administration for their ongoing engagement in this effort.

“BP - working closely with scientists and engineers from across the whole oil industry, from government agencies and departments, and with local officials along the Gulf Coast - is focused on doing everything in our power to stop the flow of oil, remove it from the surface, and protect the shoreline. We are working with state and community leaders to mitigate the impact on the lives and livelihoods of those who have been affected.

“And while we continue in these efforts, we are participating fully in investigations that will provide valuable lessons about how to prevent future incidents of this nature.”

Wednesday, May 12, 2010

Riser Insertion Tube



Graphic depicting the Riser Insertion Tube method to contain oil leaking from the riser of the Deepwater Horizon Well. This technique is one of several that technicians and engineers have developed to slow or stop oil from leaking into the Gulf of Mexico.


For information about the response effort, visit www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com.

BP says Gulf blow out preventer had been modified

WASHINGTON, May 11 (Reuters) - The blow-out preventer that was supposed to help protect against the oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico had been modified, BP America Inc (BP.L: Quote, Profile, Research) President Lamar McKay told a senate panel on Tuesday.
"I have reason to believe the BOP had been modified," McKay told the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resource, which held its first hearing into the causes of the spill that killed 11 workers and caused a leak that is still releasing thousands of barrels of oil per day.

Steven Newman, the president and chief executive of Transocean Ltd (RIGN.S: Quote, Profile, Research) said the blowout preventer had been modified in 2005 at the request of BP.
Read More




WASHINGTON – Rep. Henry Waxman says that his committee's investigation into the Gulf oil spill reveals that a key safety device, the blowout preventer, had a leak in a crucial hydraulic system.

The California Democrat said in a hearing Wednesday that the investigation also discovered that the well had failed a negative pressure test just hours before the April 20 explosion.

He cited BP documents received by the Energy and Commerce Committee that showed there was a breach in the well integrity that allowed methane gas and possibly other hydrocarbons to enter the well.